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Presentazione del

# MED & Italian Energy Report 2023


Geopolitica dell'Energia nel Mediterraneo  
tra crisi internazionali e nuove commodity energetiche

**CONFERENZA STAMPA | 6 dicembre 2023**

**ETTORE BOMPARD, Direttore Scientifico ESL@ Energy Center, Politecnico di Torino**


# The uneven allocation of fossil resources and flows

Proved crude oil and gas reserves (2021)



**Almost 95%** of both oil and gas proved reserves of Mediterranean area are located in the Southern shore

Crude oil and gas flows from Southern to Northern Shore (2021)



Northern and Eastern shores rely on Southern one for **18% and 27%** of their crude oil and gas imports, respectively

● Northern Shore    ● Southern Shore    ● Eastern Shore

● Northern Shore    ● Southern Shore    ● Eastern Shore

Source: BP Stats Review 2023

Source: Eurostat (2021 data)

# Energy commodities from and across the Mediterranean

The Mediterranean region is **both** an **energy supplier for non-Mediterranean European countries** and a **landing basin for commodities coming from non-Mediterranean countries**

## Imports of the Mediterranean region from non-Mediterranean countries (2021)

**Total Imports (LNG): 59 Tm<sup>3</sup>/y**  
**From Non-Mediterranean: 47.5 Tm<sup>3</sup>/y (82%)**  
**Main Suppliers:**

**Total Imports: 265 Mt/y**  
**From Non-Mediterranean: 173 Mt/y (65%)**  
**Main Suppliers:**


**Total Imports: 265 Mt/y**  
**From Non-Mediterranean: 173 Mt/y (65%)**  
**Main Suppliers:**

## Imports of non-Mediterranean European countries from the Mediterranean region (2021)

**Total Imports: 216 Mt/y**  
**From Mediterranean: 17.5 Mt/y (8.1%)**

**Total Imports: 218 Mt/y**  
**From Mediterranean: 18.9 Mt/y (8.7%)**

**Total Imports: 62.7 Tm<sup>3</sup>/y**  
**From Mediterranean: 1.7 Tm<sup>3</sup>/y (2.7%)**



## Main Suppliers

- |         |              |
|---------|--------------|
| USA     | Qatar        |
| Nigeria | Saudi Arabia |
| Russia  | Iraq         |

Crude Oil    Natural Gas    Oil Products


Source: Eurostat , AXSMarine-Alphatanker (2021 data)

# Strengthening the «black dialogue»: the Italian case



**Algeria** replaced Russia as the **main gas supplier** to Italy: in October 2022, Algerian imports through the **Transmed pipeline >40%** of the total, while Russian ones from **TAG less than 1%**

The **crisis** further **strengthened** the “**black dialogue**” across the Mediterranean



Source: SNAM – dati operativi business


\*from January 1<sup>st</sup> to October 31<sup>st</sup>

From 2021 to 2023:

- **Increase** in the weight of **Algeria** (+8%), **Norway** (+8%), **Azerbaijan** (+6%) and **LNG** (+12%)
- **Reduction** in the weight of **Russia** (-35%)

# The role of LNG as «game changer»

## Imports of LNG to the EU



### PROS:

High **flexibility**, **diversification** and the possibility of **increasing quickly the overall import capacity** → positive for **energy security**

### CONS:

lower **affordability** w.r.t. natural gas, due to its **higher costs** and **market competition** phenomena, especially with Asian markets




Possible **evolution** towards a **balance** between **long-term** (to reduce exposure to price volatilities) and **short-term** spot (to allow for supply flexibility) LNG **contracts**

- In the **EU**, the **import of LNG** increased from 81 Gm³/y in 2021 to **133 Gm³/y in 2022 (+64%)**
- Increasing **role of U.S.** in EU supply: 30 Gm³ (30%) in 2023, followed by Qatar (18 Gm³) and Algeria (16 Gm³)
- **EU import of Russian LNG** (mainly by **Belgium, Spain** and **France**) = 13 Gm³ (13%), with stable/slightly growing trend

# The needed transition towards renewables

## 2022 installed RES capacity, 2030 targets and share on the total of the Mediterranean area




- **RES development** in the 3 Mediterranean shores show **large differences**
- In 2022, out of **309 GW of RES installed capacity, 76% was** in the Northern shore, **18% in Türkiye**, and **only 3.6%** in the Southern shore
- To match their national targets, Mediterranean countries must sharply increase the **rate of RES penetration**
- While EU countries can benefit from **consolidated regulatory frameworks and technical knowledge**, for the other Mediterranean countries is still difficult to prioritize **sustainability**, also due to internal **political instability** and/or ongoing **conflicts**

# Energy & Economics: some open issues in the Mediterranean

The transition is heavily tackled by the presence of 2 **rentier states (Algeria and Libya)**, whose economies are almost completely relying on hydrocarbons export

Economic value of hydrocarbons export from Algeria, Libya and Egypt in 2021, and share on the total value of exports



Source: CEPII, (2022), BACI database

- **Energy transition** requires **large investments** in infrastructures, especially in **Southern shore** (to exploit the large renewable potential), **BUT avoiding** a sort of “**energy neo-colonialism**”
- In **2021**, **84.5%** of the overall **public investments** in RES in the Mediterranean region (3.5 G\$/y) was concentrated in **3 countries** of **Northern shore**: Spain (38.7%), France (36.0%) and Italy (9.9%)
- These **investments** are **affected** by **several factors**:
  - **National**: Difficulty in defining coherent and solid policies and in balancing sustainability, security and equity priorities (e.g. a central aspect affecting energy investment policies is the impact of energy prices on inflation)
  - **Regional**: lack of convergence among policies of the various countries; misalignment of standards and technological choices → long term barriers to joint developments.
  - **International**: negative influences on prices due to turbulences on global markets; unavoidable incidence on prices, costs, financial decisions, access to technologies, etc. due to global conflicts (e.g. Russia-Ukraine war)

Source: IRENA, Public investment database 2023

# Technologies for the energy transition: some comparative example



MAIN ELECTRICITY TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE TRANSITION				
Generation				
Input	Technology	TRL	Cost [\$/kWh]	Efficiency
Solar irradiance	PV: crystalline silicon	10	810 - 1120	0.17 - 0.23
	PV: multi-junction	9	4850 - 8240	0.39 - 0.47
	Floating PV	8	~ 860	0.17 - 0.23
Water	Hydro Power Plants	11	2650 - 3900	0.40 - 0.50
	Tidal stream & tidal range	9	150 - 800	~ 0.80
Wind	Onshore Wind Turbine	10	1590 - 1750	0.29 - 0.35
	Seabed fixed offshore Wind Turbine	9	2600 - 3721	0.45 - 0.51
	Floating offshore Wind Turbine	8	2936 - 3289	0.45 - 0.51
Geoth. heat	Thermal power plant	11	3851 - 10959	0.12 - 0.18
Storage				
Type	Technology	TRL	Cost [\$/kWh]	Efficiency
Mechanical	Pumped Hydro Storage	11	10 - 100	0.70 - 0.84
	Flywheel Energy Storage	9	1500 - 6000	0.70 - 0.95
	Compressed Air Energy Storage	8	50 - 80	0.70 - 0.80
Electro-chemical	Li-ion batteries	10	245 - 620	0.92 - 0.96
	Redox Flow Batteries	9	315 - 1680	~ 0.75
Conversion				
Commodity	Technology	TRL	Cost [\$/kWh]	Efficiency
Hydrogen	Solid Oxide Fuel Cells	9	3000 - 4000	0.45 - 0.50
	Molten Carbonate Fuel Cell	9	4000 - 6000	0.45 - 0.52
Transmission & Distribution				
Type	Technology	TRL	Cost [M€/km]	Efficiency
Transmission	High-voltage Direct Current	11	~3.5	~0.97
	Ultra High-voltage Alternate Current	11	~3.1	0.93 - 0.94

MAIN HYDROGEN TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE TRANSITION				
Generation				
Input	Technology	TRL	Cost [\$/kWh]	Efficiency
Electricity	Alkaline electrolyser	9	500 - 1400	0.58 - 0.70
	Proton Exchange Membrane electrol.	9	1100 - 1800	0.50 - 0.83
	Solid Oxide electrolyser	8	2800 - 5600	up to 0.84
Storage				
Type	Technology	TRL	Cost [\$/kg <sub>H2</sub> ]	Efficiency
Physical	Pressure vessel	11	712 - 998	0.91
	Liquid hydrogen tank	9	1905	0.71
	Salt cavern	10	0.6	0.98
Transmission & Distribution				
Type	Technology	TRL	Cost [\$/kg <sub>H2</sub> ]	Efficiency
Open-sea	Ammonia tanker ships	11	1.2	0.90
Captive	Hydrogen pipeline	9	1.5	~1.00

Currently multi-junctions PV cells have an efficiency double w.r.t. crystalline silicon ones, but the needed investment cost can be up to 8 times

The conversion of hydrogen in electricity through fuel cells hydrogen has relatively low efficiency (~50%) with associated relevant investment costs


The Solid Oxide electrolysers have higher efficiency w.r.t. the traditional ones (ALK, PEM), but a still low level of maturity and an investment cost up to 4 times

**TRL scale** (ref. IEA): **11**: Proof of stability reached; **10**: Integration needed at scale; **9**: Commercial operation in relevant environment; **8**: First of a kind commercial

Source: ESL@energycenter elaboration based on IEA and IRENA data



# The need for a Multicommodity energy system




- **Electricity from renewables** is expected to assume the **central role** in the future energy mix and in building a new “**green**” **dialogue**
- However, electricity **cannot completely decarbonise** by itself the Mediterranean energy systems, due to “**hard-to-abate**” final uses (e.g., production of high temperature process heat in industry and long-distance maritime and aviation transport)



- Need for a **synergy** between electricity and **other commodities**, like green **hydrogen** (produced through water electrolysis by means of electricity from RES), **alternative fuels**, **geothermal**, **solar thermal** and **nuclear** heat

# Energy Commodity Chains (ECCs) as a tool to compare alternative pathways

- ECCs are defined as the set of processes that **energy commodities** undergo along their path to final uses, from being harnessed from primary energy sources
- The **same final use** can be fed by more than one commodity, as well as being provided by different technologies
- ECCs are a tool to **quantitatively evaluate** equivalent but alternative energy pathways, and **rank** them basing on a set of **numerical metrics**



- **Electricity** is by far the most energy-efficient choice, with **overall energy efficiencies even above 90%**
- Hydrogen suffers from the relatively **low conversion efficiency** of **electrolysis process (40% less available energy)**
- The need to decarbonize must inevitably take into account the massive infrastructural and financial effort required to deploy commodities alternative to electricity, but energy-inefficient

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**Grazie per l'attenzione**

