



## On graphicality and decomposition of games

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joint work with Giacomo Como and Fabio Fagnani

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
# INTRODUCTION

- **Graphical games:** games equipped with a network structure
  - A graph specifies the pattern of dependence of utilities
- Model for the emergence of **global phenomena**
  - in socio-economic networks
  - in engineering and computer science
- A **general theory** is still missing
  - how graphicality of games reflects on their properties?



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## GAMES

- Strategic form games:
- $\mathcal{V}$  players  
 $\forall i \in \mathcal{V}, A^i$  actions of  $i$   
 $\mathcal{X} = \prod_{i \in \mathcal{V}} A^i$  strategies
- $\Gamma(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{X})$ : games with players  $\mathcal{V}$  and strategies  $\mathcal{X}$ , identified by the utility vector  $u$ .
- $x, y \in \mathcal{X}, i \in \mathcal{V}$ . We say that  $x$  and  $y$  are  *$i$ -comparable*, if  $x_j = y_j$  for every  $j \neq i$  and  $x_i \neq y_i$ .  
 $\mathcal{X}^{(2)} \subset \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{X}$  pairs of comparable strategies.

- $\forall i \in \mathcal{V}, u_i : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  utility of  $i$ .



## GRAPHICAL GAMES

- $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$  digraph.  $u \in \Gamma(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{X})$  is a  $\mathcal{G}$ -game if for every  $x, y \in \mathcal{X}$


$$x_j = y_j \quad \forall j \in N(i)^+ \cup \{i\} \Rightarrow u_i(x) = u_i(y).$$

- Every game is graphical on the complete graph on  $\mathcal{V}$
- $\mathcal{G}(u)$  is the minimal graph of  $u$

- Pairwise graphical games

- graphicality is a design property
- undirected weighted graph  $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, W, \mathcal{E})$ .  $\forall \{i, j\} \in \mathcal{E}$ , players  $i$  and  $j$  are involved in a 2-player game  $u_{\{i,j\}}$ , with utilities  $u_{ij}$  and  $u_{ji}$ .
- $u \in \Gamma_{\mathcal{G}}(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{X})$  is a pairwise graphical  $\mathcal{G}$ -game if

$$u_i(x) = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}} W_{ij} u_{ij}(x_i, x_j) \quad \forall x \in \mathcal{X},$$



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
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
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## STRATEGIC EQUIVALENCE

- $u \in \Gamma(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{X})$  is a **non-strategic game** ( $u \in \mathcal{N}$ ) if  $\forall i \in \mathcal{V}$  and any  $(x, y) \in \mathcal{X}^{(2)}$   $i$ -comparable,

$$u_i(x) - u_i(y) = 0.$$

- Games in  $\mathcal{N}^\perp$  are called **normalized games** as they satisfy the normalization condition:

$$\forall i \in \mathcal{V}, \forall x \in \mathcal{X}, \quad \sum_{y: (y, x) \text{ are } i\text{-comp.}} u_i(y) = 0$$

- $u, v \in \Gamma(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{X})$  are **strategically equivalent** if  $u - v \in \mathcal{N}$ .
- in every strategic equivalence class  $[u]$ ,  $u \in \Gamma(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{X})$ , there exists exactly one normalized member  $u^{norm}$ .

# GRAPHICALITY OF STRATEGICALLY EQUIVALENT GAMES


- Strategic equivalence does not preserve graphicality.

## Theorem

Let  $u \in \Gamma(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{X})$ . There exist  $u^* \in [u]$  such that  $\mathcal{G}(u^*)$  is minimal, i.e.  $\mathcal{G}(u^*) \subseteq \mathcal{G}(v)$  for every  $v \in [u]$ .

Moreover, a possible choice for  $u^*$  is the normalized game  $u^{norm}$ .

- The minimal graph  $\mathcal{G}([u])$  represents the **minimal topological complexity** needed to represent a game in  $[u]$ .



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


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## POTENTIAL AND HARMONIC GAMES

- $u \in \Gamma(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{X})$  is a **potential game** if there exists a function  $\phi \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{X}}$ , called **potential**, such that  $\forall i \in \mathcal{V}$  and any two strategies  $x$  and  $y$  that are  $i$ -comparable

$$u_i(x) - u_i(y) = \phi(x) - \phi(y), \quad \forall (x, y) \in \mathcal{X}^{(2)}$$



- $u \in \Gamma(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{X})$  is an **harmonic game** if for every strategy  $x \in \mathcal{X}$

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## DECOMPOSITION OF GAMES

Theorem (Candogan, Menache, Ozdaglar, Parrilo, 2010)

*The space of games can be decomposed as*

$$\Gamma(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{X}) = \mathcal{P} \oplus \mathcal{N} \oplus \mathcal{H}$$

where  $\oplus$  denotes the direct sum.  $\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{N}^\perp \cap P$  is the space of normalized potential games,  $\mathcal{N}$  is the space of non-strategic games,  $\mathcal{H} = \mathcal{N}^\perp \cap H$  is the space of normalized harmonic games.

- Classical decomposition does not take into account **graphical structure** of games.
- Main result: how graphicality interacts with the decomposition of games.

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
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## DECOMPOSITION OF GRAPHICAL GAMES

$u \in \Gamma_{\mathcal{G}}(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{V})$ . On which graph are its component graphical? What is the relation with  $\mathcal{G}$ ?

- Pairwise graphical games  $\rightarrow$  classical decomposition can be exploited



### Theorem

Let  $u$  be a pairwise  $\mathcal{G}$ -game with decomposition  $u = u_{\mathcal{P}} + u_{\mathcal{H}} + u_{\mathcal{N}}$ .


Then

- $\mathcal{G}(u_{\mathcal{P}})$  contains  $\{i, j\} \in \mathcal{E}$  iff  $u_{\{i, j\}}$  is not purely harmonic,
  - $\mathcal{G}(u_{\mathcal{H}})$  contains  $\{i, j\} \in \mathcal{E}$  iff  $u_{\{i, j\}}$  is not purely potential,
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- $\mathcal{G}(u_{\mathcal{P}}), \mathcal{G}(u_{\mathcal{H}}), \mathcal{G}(u_{\mathcal{N}})$  are subgraphs of  $\mathcal{G}$ .
    - decomposition does not create any link between players not directly interacting in the original game.

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


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
## DECOMPOSITION OF GRAPHICAL GAMES

- **Non pairwise** graphical games  $\rightarrow$  graphicality and decomposition interact in a complex fashion

### Theorem 2

Every game  $u \in \Gamma_{\mathcal{G}}(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{X})$  can be decomposed as  $u = u_{\mathcal{P}} + u_{\mathcal{H}} + u_{\mathcal{N}}$  where

- the normalized potential component  $u_{\mathcal{P}}$  is a  $\mathcal{G}^{\Delta}$ -game
  - the normalized harmonic component  $u_{\mathcal{H}}$  is a  $\mathcal{G}^{\Delta}$ -game
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- $\mathcal{G}^{\Delta}$ : undirected graph with nodes  $\mathcal{V}$  and links among players belonging to a **common out-neighbourhood** in  $\mathcal{G}$ .
    - Hidden strategic interactions have short range.






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
$$Fl = \left\{ F \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{X}^{(2)}} \mid F(x, y) = -F(y, x), \forall (x, y) \in \mathcal{X}^{(2)} \right\}$$

- Flows are defined on the edges of the strategy graph  $\mathcal{G}_{str} = (\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{X}^{(2)})$ .
- $D : \Gamma(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{X}) \rightarrow Fl$  maps the game  $u \in \Gamma(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{X})$  to the flow  $Du = F \in Fl$  s.t.

$$F(x, y) = u_i(y) - u_i(x) \quad \forall (x, y) \in \mathcal{X}^{(2)}$$

where  $i$  is the only player s.t.  $x$  and  $y$  are  $i$ -comparable.

- **Flow characterization** of potentiality, harmonicity and graphicality.
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

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

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
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## EXAMPLE

- $\mathcal{G}$  represents social interactions of players  $\mathcal{V}$
- $\mathcal{A}^i = \{0, 1\}$ ,  $\forall i \in \mathcal{V}$ : players decide of acquiring (action 1) or not acquiring (0) some good



- players  $i \neq 1$  have imitative behaviour  $\rightarrow$  majority game

$$u_i(a_i, x_{N(i)}) = |\{j \in N(i) : x_j = a_i\}|, \quad a_i = 0, 1$$

- player 1  $\rightarrow$  public good game

$$u_1(1, x_{N(1)}) = 1 - c$$

$$u_1(0, x_{N(1)}) = 1 \quad \text{if } x_j = 1 \text{ for some } j \in N(1)$$

$$u_1(0, x_{N(1)}) = 0 \quad \text{if } x_j = 0 \text{ for all } j \in N(1)$$

- Local perturbation of a potential game
  - locality is preserved in the decomposition.

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- players  $i \neq 1$  have imitative behaviour  $\rightarrow$  **majority game**

$$u_i(a_i, x_{N(i)}) = |\{j \in N(i) : x_j = a_i\}|, \quad a_i = 0, 1$$


- player 1  $\rightarrow$  **public good game**

$$u_1(1, x_{N(1)}) = 1 - c$$


$$u_1(0, x_{N(1)}) = 1 \quad \text{if } x_j = 1 \text{ for some } j \in N(1)$$

$$u_1(0, x_{N(1)}) = 0 \quad \text{if } x_j = 0 \text{ for all } j \in N(1)$$


- Local perturbation of a potential game
  - **locality** is preserved in the decomposition.



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## FUTURE WORK

- **Refinement** of the results
  - Separable graphical games
- **Interpretation** of the results
  - Role of hidden strategic interactions
- Graphical potential games and **Markov Random Fields**
  - Decomposition of the potential
- **Robustness** analysis of games
  - Properties of perturbations of potential games



Thank you for the attention



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